Indian moral system contains within it both social ethics and individual ethics. The whole of Indian moral system proceeds on the assumption that as a human being every man has to discharge two types of moral obligations- one related to the other member so the society and the other related to one’s own self. Under the former once such virtues or duties as ahimsa, dana, daya (compassion) paropakara (help or service to other, asana, prnayama and such other methods of cittasuddi etc. The idea here is that morality is the inculcation and practice of characteristic human virtues as against the animal inclinations. The question of the inculcation or practice of such human virtues or duties arises not only in relation to the other members of the society, but in relation to oneself also by virtue of one being a man, and not a bare animal.
Indian outlook is spiritual and the Indian moral system is oriented towards that spiritual goal, The spiritual goal is generally known as Moksa and morality in any of its form is a means to that goal. So morality in India is thoroughly spiritualistic.
Indian moral system has a metaphysical basis. In the West, ethics is autonomous and it does not need to have a metaphysical or religious foundation. It is a social affair and therefore the ought-questions of morality are to be decided simply on social and rational considerations. It does not need to have any transcendental basis. Moreover, metaphysics purports to deal with factual (although of a fundamental nature) questions and purely factual considerations can never become a foundation of deciding ought-questions. For, from mere ‘is’, there is non-passage to ‘ought’. If, however, we make such a passage, we become victim of a fallacy popularly known as ‘naturalistic fallacy’. The two distinguished features of Indian concept of morality are as follows: (1). Authority has the basis for deciding what is moral and what is immoral and (2). Morality refers not only to the social obligations but also to obligations related to one’s own self.
Indian ethics has been more perceptive than speculative or critical. Indian thinkers have always adopted a practical outlook and consequently they have never separated theoretical thinking form their practical consequences. This is obvious in Indian philosophical thinking conspicuously marked, as it I, by the practical concern of live rating people from the ocean of worldly misery. Even in logical thinking this concern may be seen in the Indian logician’s refusal to bring about sharp distinction between formal and material truth or between deduction and induction. This concern finds articulation in Indian ethics, which is by and large perceptive, prescriptive or normative. In other words, the primary concern of Indian ethics has been to prescribe norms for a morally elevated life in both its personal and social aspects.
Moreover, Indian moral system is out and out humanistic. To many western scholars, this characteristic may sound just the opposite of what they have so far thought to be the actual position. Many Western thinkers dealing with the ethical aspect of Indian thought have opined that room for humanistic ethics in Indian thought is unlikely, because it is basically other worldly and life-negating in its approach. Such an impression about Indian thought betrays one’s utter ignorance about its true nature and spirit. The Advaita Vedanta does not deny the reality of this world outright. Rather, on the contrary, it fully firms the reality of the world from the practical standpoint. And from this standpoint all ordinary human relationships are fully real, so that there is a full-fledged scope for a humanistic ethics. Even from the real standpoint, or what may even be called the transcendental standpoint, Samakara does not so much deny the reality of this world as he insists on re-interpreting it. According to him, what is to be realised from the real standpoint is not that the world is complete void, but that is fully spiritual and devoid of multiplicity. The multiplicity and materiality are illusions. What is real is spiritual unity. And what can be a more solid basis for humanistic ethics, rather fro universalistic ethics, than this kind of realisation that the apparent multiplicity of the word is sheer illusion and what is real is a basic spiritual unity? This will be still clearer if we try to see to some extent what humanism actually means and implies.
Modern Indian thinkers such as, Vivekananda, Tagore and Gandhi have sought to make morality a direct means to Moksa.They presented such a conception of Moksa that even social morality by itself becomes directly relevant for the attainment of Moksa. Moksa for them is nothing other than what Tagore specifically calls realising oneself into other and others into oneself, or else, realising the universal self within the individual self. Such a realisation they point out, perhaps rightly, is possible only by cultivating the social virtues of compassion, love, brotherhood etc. Morality becomes a path of direct relevance for the attainment of the highest ideal of life.
The rightness and wrongness of an action is determined with reference to its conduciveness or unconduciveness to pre-accepted non-moral goals. The theory of ethics based on answer of this type is known as teleological theory. The other type does not refer to any ulterior non-moral end or goal. According to it, an action is right or wrong in virtue of its own merit or demerit and not in terms of the goal that it leads or does not lead to. The theory of ethics based on answer of the above kind is knows as the deontological theory.
Deontological theories deny what teleological theories affirm. They deny that the right, the obligatory and the morally good are wholly, whether, directly or indirectly, a function of what is non-morally good… They assert that there are other considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences- certain features of the act itself other than value it brings into existence, for example, the fact that it keeps a promise, is just, or is commanded by God or State. Teleologists believe that there is one and only one basic or ultimate right-making characteristic, namely the comparative value (non-moral) of what is, probably will be, or is intended to be brought into being. Deontologists either deny that this characteristic is right making at all or they insist that there are other basic or ultimate right making characteristics as well.”
It is clear from the above that for a teleological theory conduciveness to some goal is the necessary criterion for the rightness of an action whereas for deontological theory either it is not at all the case of at least it is not the only and exclusive criterion for judging an action to be right; there are also other considerations besides. Now let us try to categorise the Indian theories of moral obligation and value as teleological and deontological on the basis of the above clarifications regarding the nature of the two theories.
In a way the whole Indian ethical system is deontological something is dharma (duty, obligation or virtue) simple because it is a Vedic law or Dharma Sutras and Sastras prescribe it. This seems to be the temperament of the entire Indian system taken in general. We have seen definition of morality being advanced more often in terms of what is enjoined by the Vedas and Dharma Sastras. It is hardly said that what leads to Moksa is morality, bit it is repeatedly said that what is enjoined by the Vedas, or what is willed by God or what marks the imitation of the virtues imbibed by God is morality. The Mimamsa clearly says there is no duty other than what is prescribed by the Vedas. So something is duty because it is enjoined by the Vedas as duty.
The Nyaya- Vaisesika
In the Vaiseskika sutras, the very definition of dharma is given in terms of the ulterior ends like abhyudaya (prosperity) and nihsreyasa. It is said that what ever leads to prosperity and highest end is dharma. So here it seems clear that the obligator ness for dharma arises from the twin ends of worldly prosperity and final liberation. Some actions are to be called moral or immoral with reference to whether they lead to the twin ends or not. The Vaisesika morality is definitely teleological then. Similarly, the Nyaya gives primary importance to Istasadhanata in determining the obligator ness of a moral action, or a moral law on which some action is based.
The Mimamsa
As opposed to this, the Mimamsakas do not take the obligator ness of moral actions as stemming from the consequence or the end. According the Kumarila, the end or phala may be said to determine the motive of the agent, but not eh obligatoriness. The obligatoriness is the result of the Vidhi of which the action in question is an instance. The imperativenss or the obligatoriness of the action is independent of the end or phala. To quote Professor Mitra again, “According to Kumarila, the end, the consequence determines only the motive or the choice, but not he obligatoriness of the imperative… The phala or consequence is only pravarttaka, i.e. a psychological motive but is not vidheya, i.e. the object of moral imperative. It is a psychological implicate of the moral action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for all actions, but it is not a moral implicate of the imperative which is obligatory independently of the end of consequence. Hence, the end or phala, according to Kumarila, forms only to motive to move the agent for action. What makes the action moral or immoral is simply its Vedic sanction or lack of it. The moral obligatoriness of the action follows from the Vedic source without any consideration for the consequence.
The Ramanuja Vedanta
The Visistadvaita system of Ramanuja also comes to be a deontological system on scrutiny insofar as its characterisation as a moral system is concerned. Like other Indian systems, the system of Ramanuja also takes Moksa to be the ultimate human ed. Furthermore, by virtue of believing in samuccayavada. Ramanuja gives morality an important place in men’s effort for attaining Moksa. But the question is, does conduciveness to Moksa constitute the necessary condition for an action to be moral? Does the obligatoriness of a moral action follow from the final end Moksa? The answer is a clear ‘no’. For the obligator- ness of moral actions in the system of Ramanuja follows from the fact that moral qualities in their absolute and ultimate perfection constitute the essential nature of God and man’s duty is simply to imitate or to follow those moral qualities. Thus man’s moral virtues and duties are derivations from God’s moral qualities. They are to be observed and followed simply because they represent God’s qualities and God wants men to follow the moral qualities that He possesses in a perfect and absolute manner. So the sanction and authority of morality comes from no less a being than God. Moral qualities imbibed by God in a perfect manner are for us to imitate. In other words, out duty is to behave in a way God would do in a similar circumstance. For example, God possesses the moral quality of compassion, so we should be compassionate towards other; God possesses the quality of forgiveness, so we should forgive those who do wrong to us, and so on. In Ramanuja’s system God is regarded as a Moral Ideal with reference to which man’s duties are to be derived or deduced. So man’s moral duties follow directly from the moral perfections of God and not from any non-moral end like Moksa. So, Ramanuja’s system also is a deontological system and not a teleological one.
The Samkhya and the Advaita Vedanta
In Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta, as we have already seen, morality is neither necessary not sufficient for Moksa. So the question of the obligatoriness of the moral actions following from this non-moral end perhaps does not arise. Nevertheless, none of the systems takes moral virtues and duties simply valueless. What Samkhya criticises in the name of works are mainly ritualistic acts of the Vedas. But in its turn Samkya realises the importance of the moral virtues following from the sattvika nature of man. These moral virtues pave to some extent one’s path for Moksa also. But what is important to realise is that these moral virtues do not derive their sanction from end whether Moksa or anything else. They derive their sanction rather from the metaphysical nature of man.
Man as psychological being is an evolute of Prakrti. Of the three gunas of Prakrti, Sattva is the most commendable, because it is the repository of good human qualities. So virtues following from Sattva, such as kindness, restraint of sense organs etc., are to be inculcated and followed. Similarly, in Samkara moral virtues do not derive their sanction from Moksa, although they serve as auxiliaries in the attainment of Moksa.
After getting the reflection of the purusha, prakiti becomes conscious and agitated. This agitation disturbs the equilibrium of the three constituents of prakiti (sattwa, raja and tama) and thereby evolution becomes operative. First of all, the sattwa contituent becomes dominant and reason (buddhi) appears. It has cosmic significance and hence is called the Great (Mahat). Although reason is cosmic and above the ego, it is still individual and there are as many reasons as individual egos. The ego (ahamkara) evolves out of reason. Depending upon the dominance of one of the three constituents (gunas), we get three kinds of ego.
1. Sattvika ahamkara
2. Rajasika ahamkara and
3. Tamasika ahamkara
The Non-orthodox Systems (Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism)
Of the three non-orthodox Indian systems, the Carvaka (which is a Hindu system) is definitely a teleological system, because, according to it, the criterion for any action to be moral is the conduciveness of that action to worldly pleasure, a non-moral end. But the two non-Hindu systems- Bauddha and Jaina- are essentially deontological in nature. Like idealistic or spiritualistic Hindu systems they, no doubt, believe that performance of moral acts somehow contributes to the attainment of that performance of moral acts somehow contributes to the attainment of Moksa. In other words, we can say that both of these systems believe that moral actions definitely lead to desirable consequences in respect of both the worldly life and the life beyond. But the obligatoriness of moral actions or principles according to none of these systems flows from any extraneous end or goal. On the other hand, the obligatoriness flows from the venerable authority that is bestowed upon the original propounders of the two systems- Lord Buddha and Lord Mahavira.
Thus despite Moksa being the ultimate human end towards which all philosophical, religious and moral efforts are supposed to be directed in the Indian tradition, the Indian moral system, by and large, proves to be deontological in nature. And it is quite natural for it to be so. We have seen that the Sastras have been regarded as the primary source and sanction of dharma in India. That implies that although the observance of the Sastric dharmas naturally and undoubtedly leads to good consequences, their moral worth is not to be evaluated in terms of the consequences. Their moral worth is to be determined and assessed only with reference to whether they are enjoined by the Sastras. In other words, dharma is dharma not because it leads to Moksa, but because it has been enjoined by authority to be dharma. Hence, clearly the overall tone of Indian morality is deontological, implying thereby that dharma is to be followed for the reason that it is dharma as enjoyed by authority.
In the Indian context, man’s own nature furnishes a justification for his being moral. Perhaps this is why most Indian systems prove to be deontological in nature. According to them, dharma is to be followed because it is its own justification. Moksa has been brought forth as a motivation in the sense that one who will follow dharma will automatically pave his way for that, but Moksa has never been taken as a justification for being moral. Morality is involved in the nature of man. This can find an apt solution in solving the corporate ethical dilemmas.
